This paper examines how increased uncertainty about an emerging market's international reserves affects the willingness of foreign investors to supply international credits. We illustrate the relevance of this concern for South Korea during the recent financial crisis. Using available information about Korea's reserves at the onset of the crisis, we show that "usable" reserves turned out to be much lower than what a reasonable forecast would have predicted. We then develop a model of an emerging-market economy where there is sovereign risk and moral hazard is a problem because agents expect the emerging market to bail out creditors with its reserves.
I.

Introduction
In October, 1997, turbulence in Hong Kong's foreign exchange and equity markets spread rapidly to other emerging markets. During the same period, market participants became aware that the Bank of Korea was unable to use a large share of its reserves because it had previously placed them with foreign branches of domestic banks. Uncertainty about the size of South Korea's "usable" reserves contributed to the crisis atmosphere in which investors had to operate. In this paper, we examine how increased uncertainty about an emerging market's reserves might affect the willingness of foreign investors to supply international credit. We show that increased reserve uncertainty has a nonlinear and potentially large adverse effect on the supply of international credit. As a result, it can contribute to the liquidity shortage often experienced by emerging markets during a crisis.
We start with an overview of the events that led to increased uncertainty about Korean reserves. Then, using available information about the reserve path before the onset of the crisis, we show that official reserves and, even more dramatically, usable reserves, turned out to be much lower that what a reasonable forecast would have predicted.
Next, we examine the impact of greater reserve uncertainty on the supply of international credit. We model an emerging-market economy where the private sector believes the domestic authority will use its international reserves to bail out lenders. The moral hazard problem associated with domestic bailouts has been cited by various observers as a contributing factor in the Asian financial crisis.
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We derive the supply of international credit to emerging markets when reserve uncertainty interacts with uncertainty about the probability of a reserve-financed bailout.
We show that when the expected reserve position of emerging markets is large relative to the potential bailout in a bad state of nature, reserve volatility does not matter. However, the same amount of reserve volatility can cause a large reduction in the offered supply of international credit if emerging-market debt is large enough or if the collapse of output forces the private sector to downgrade its priors about repayment possibilities. In addition, reserve volatility can reduce international credit if investors become more pessimistic about the expected reserve position of emerging markets.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the evolution of Korean reserves and compares the actual paths of reported and usable reserves with a forecast based on an auto-regressive process. Section III describes the model and analyzes the effects of lower expected reserve levels and increased volatility of reserves on the supply of international credit extended to emerging markets. Section IV concludes.
II. South Korea's reserve holdings
In the summer of 1997, concern mounted about whether South Korea could withstand the financial crisis engulfing its Asian neighbors. South Korea's official reserve position appeared strong. After having seen its reserves decline during the first quarter of 1997 following labor unrest and the Hanbo Steel bankruptcy, the Bank of Korea reported a recovery in its reserve holdings during the second quarter. It announced that its May reserve holdings were almost $32 billion. It put its end-of-June holdings at $33.3 billion.
But over the summer and into the fall, there were rumors that South Korea's central bank had built up forward dollar liabilities by intervening in the forward market for won. In addition, stories circulated that the Bank of Korea was placing foreign-currency deposits with foreign branches of domestic Korean banks. It was not clear at the time whether this emergency short-term liquidity support for Korean banks was affecting official reserves.
As it turned out, the severity of the liquidity pressures facing these banks meant that the central-bank deposits could not be withdrawn. Consequently, the international reserves the Bank of Korea could use in a crisis were considerably less than its reported official reserves.
Indeed, the gap between South Korea's "official" and "usable" reserves turned out to be sizeable. The International Monetary Fund later reported that while official Korean reserves fell from $31 billion to $24 billion between the end of October and early December, 1997, usable reserves were only about $ 6 billion (Adams et. al. , 1998, p. 20) . The size of the gap was unknown to investors when Thailand floated its currency on July 2, 1997, triggering the start of the Asian crisis. All investors had to go on were the reported official reserve figures and rumors that some of those reserves could not be accessed in case of an emergency. When, a few weeks later, Kia Motors requested a debt work-out with its major creditors to avoid bankruptcy, confidence was further undermined.
The OECD later reported that "the lack of timely, reliable information on the state of (Korean) banks' non-performing loans, official foreign exchange reserves and foreign debt added to uncertainty" during this period. (OECD, 1998, p. 31 ).
The Korean case raises an interesting set of questions. How does uncertainty about the level of reserves affect the behavior of foreign lenders? Can reserve uncertainty contribute to the onset of crisis? Does it make more severe a crisis that has already begun?
Before examining these questions with the help of a model, we can get some suggestive evidence on investor beliefs about Korean reserve levels by constructing confidence bands around a prediction of reserves. To obtain the prediction, we assume that investors viewed Korean official reserves as following an auto-regressive process. We therefore regress monthly Korean official reserves on a constant and lagged official reserves for the period January, 1995-July, 1997, where the June, 1997, official reserve holdings represent the last available data for use in estimation prior to the start of the Asian crisis. For these 30 observations, the regression results are:
where F * is the logarithm of official foreign-currency reserves and standard errors of the estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses. The adjusted R 2 is 0.84, the standard error of the regression is 0.0350 and the Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.65 suggests that serial correlation is not a serious problem. Suppose foreign lenders had used equation (1) to forecast Korean reserves after June, 1997. What would be the implication of having done so? 2 2 For small samples, one cannot reject the hypothesis that reserves follow a random walk.
Both the auto-regressive process and the random walk formulation have similar implications for our topic of interest. Estimating (1) through October 1997 does not affect the main results. Note that F t * is measured in log($ billions). Figure 2 illustrates the data ultimately reported for official and usable reserves from mid-1996 through mid-1998. 3 In addition, the figure shows the predicted values of Korean official reserves for the estimation period based on the auto-regressive process and the 95% confidence band surrounding that prediction. For the period July, 1997 and after, we assume that investors continued to use the June, 1997 official reserve report to predict monthly reserves. However, the confidence bands around the prediction widened to reflect the growing uncertainty about the true value of reserves. Note that even before Thailand devalued the baht on July 2, usable reserves were considerably beneath the lower confidence band. After the Thai devaluation, Korean official reserves began to move toward the lower confidence band, and shortly after the Hong Kong and Chinese stock market crises hit on October 25, 1997, even official reserves moved below the lower confidence band, while usable reserves were multiple standard deviations below the band.
Thus both officially-reported reserves and usable reserves turned out to be much lower than any reasonable forecast.
III. The Model
Consider a global economy composed of a high-income countries and emergingmarket economies. Agents in the high-income countries are risk neutral, so their preferences over a two-period planning horizon are characterized by:
where ρ is the rate of time preference and coincides with the risk-free interest rate.
Agents in the emerging-market economies have preferences represented by
We assume that ρ * > ρ because the real interest rate in the emerging-market economies is substantially above the rate in the high-income group.
The only exogenous source of uncertainty is a productivity shock to secondperiod output in the emerging markets:
where ε is a stochastic shock with probability density function f (ε) over the range −ε 0 ≤ ε ≤ ε 0 , with ε 0 ≥ 0 . All private agents are price takers.
The emerging-market economies may borrow internationally, but their ability to borrow is constrained by the limited enforceability of international contracts. Consider the simple case where the emerging markets initially have no outstanding foreign debt.
Suppose that the high-income countries lend an aggregate amount B 1 * in period 1 to private agents in the emerging-market group at a contractual interest rate of r. In period 2, the borrowers must repay the loan, but because their output is uncertain, they may default.
Let S 2 denote the debt repayment to foreign creditors in period 2. In the event of default, suppose creditors can penalize the borrowing countries by reducing their net output by an amount χY 2 * . The parameter χ reflects the bargaining power of foreign lenders, where up to a fraction χ of output can be "confiscated" by lenders due to the threat of embargoes, retaliatory trade measures and other actions. 4 Consequently, the effective ceiling on net resource transfers to creditors is:
The size of the productivity shock that makes the emerging-market countries indifferent between repaying the loan or defaulting and facing the output penalty is ε * , where ε * is determined by the condition (1+ r)B 1
For realized productivity shocks between −ε 0 andε * , default saves the borrowers (at the expense of the lenders) the difference between the contractual repayment and the output penalty. We denote this gap --the potential bailout --by b
The international credit market is risk neutral and characterized by competition among banks that are fully informed about the debt exposure of the emerging-market group. Default by the emerging markets requires that creditor banks spend real resources µ in order to verify the productivity shock and to enforce the transfer of resources from emerging markets according to (5).
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Since large defaults are potentially destabilizing, agents anticipate there is some probability of a public bailout by the treasury or central bank of the emerging-market block. 6 We summarize the bailout expectations in a reduced-form equation, where the bailout probability φ * increases with the default size:
In the event of a default, emerging-market governments try to compensate lenders for the revenue shortfall using their period-two net international reserves, F 2 * .
However, their reserve stockpile may not be adequate to accomplish a full bailout.
Creditor income earned on the loan in the case of default and a bailout is equal to either the full bailout or the stock of reserves held by emerging markets, whichever is less, plus the output penalty obtained by lenders:
5 To simplify, we lump together the costs of monitoring and enforcement, and we ignore the possibility of randomized monitoring. Boyd and Smith (1994) show that random monitoring makes the financial contract more complex without altering first-order welfare effects. See Townsend (1979) for a model where a debt contract with state verification costs is optimal. See Bernanke and Gertler (1989) for a related analysis.
6 While our focus is on the impact of uncertainty about the international reserves of the emerging markets, we can easily add within our framework uncertainty about the possibility of eventual bailouts financed by the global financial community. For a model of moral hazard generated by the expectation of a bailout by the international community, see Aizenman and Turnovsky (1999) .
The intertemporal pattern of consumption and lending is determined by agents who maximize their discounted expected utility. The risk neutrality of lenders implies that they offer an elastic supply of credit at an expected yield equal to their rate of time preference. Thus the interest rate on emerging-market debt (r) is determined by an arbitrage condition that equates the expected yield on loans to emerging markets to the risk-free return:
The left-hand side of (10) consists of two components: (i) the return on the loan in the absence of default; (ii) the return on the loan in the presence of default, which equals the possible bailout and the share of foreign output claimed in a default, all less enforcement costs.
Using (7), we can rewrite the left-hand side of (10) as:
Equations (10) and (11) imply that the financial premium charged to emerging markets takes into account the riskiness of these loans:
Note that monitoring and enforcement costs are passed on to borrowers by way of higher borrowing rates.
For future reference, we will want to use a rearranged version of (12):
We now examine how uncertainty about reserves held by emerging markets affects the supply of international credit they can obtain. Consider the simplest form of international reserve uncertainty that gives rise to a gap between "official international reserves" and "actual reserves". Suppose actual reserves in period two are either low or high with equal probabilities:
(1− λ) with probability 0.5 F * (1+ λ) with probability 0.5
where F * is the expected, or officially reported, value of reserves and reserve volatility is given by λ, with 1 ≥ λ ≥ 0 . 
or equivalently, if
We define ε as the value of the productivity shock that requires emerging markets to use all their reserves to meet the bailout in the state where reserves are low. This value of ε makes (14') hold as an equality and is given by :
We denote ε as the value of the productivity shock that equates the needed bailout to total reserves in the state where reserves are high. [where b = F * (1+ λ) ]:
For productivity shocks in the range ε ≤ ε ≤ ε , the scarcity of reserves binds with probability one-half in the event of a bailout. If actual reserves are insufficient for a full bailout, the bailout is partial and equals F * (1 − λ) . For productivity shocksε ≤ ε , all bailouts are constrained by reserves. Assuming that a bailout occurs, the expected bailout is summarized by
where E b is the expected size of the bailout, conditional on having a bailout. Figure 3a illustrates the expected repayment of the loan for given values of the productivity shock. In the absence of a bailout, the repayment is the minimum of the contractual debt repayment (curve PK) and the output penalty (curve NJ). This repayment is traced out by the thick dashed curve NLK. For shocks in the range −ε 0 ≤ ε ≤ ε *, if a bailout occurs, the expected repayment is equal to the return in the absence of a bailout plus either a full bailout or a bailout that just exhausts the reserves held by the emerging markets. This expected repayment ( χY 2
illustrated by the curve ′ N ′ M ML. 8 Figure 3a shows that the expected return to creditors is constrained by reserve uncertainty when the productivity shock lies in the range −ε 0 ≤ ε ≤ ε . To calculate the expected repayment on the foreign loan when the shock is in the default range −ε 0 ≤ ε ≤ ε *, we substitute (17) into (10) to get: 
Substituting (18) into (12), we note that the interest rate on loans to emerging markets (r) is determined by:
Equation (19) defines the supply of international credit facing the economy (along with the definitions of ε * ,ε ,ε ). We denote the left-hand side of (19) by H.
Applying the implicit function theorem to (12'), the slope of the supply of foreign credit facing the emerging market is
We assume that the emerging-market economies operate along the upward-sloping portion of the supply of international credit. backward bending at interest rates marginally above the risk-free rate. In these circumstances it would be in the interest of borrowers to prohibit borrowing.
Consequently, we assume µf (−ε 0 ) χY * <1 , so that the supply-of-credit curve is upward sloping at relatively low interest rates. In general, the supply curve may contain a backward-bending section at high interest rates and external debt levels. In these circumstances, it would be in the interest of the borrowers to adopt policies that prevent them from reaching the backward-bending section of the supply curve since such a point entails lower welfare than the point where external borrowing is maximized. See Aizenman (1989) for further discussion.
10 The supply of international credit (defined implicitly by (19)) and the demand for international credit jointly determine the equilibrium interest rate and lending level. The demand for credit is obtained from (3) when price-taking agents maximize expected utility.
We focus our attention on the supply side.
Applying (19), we find that for a given interest rate, a downward revision in the expected reserve level shifts the supply of credit curve leftward since:
This reduction in the supply of international credit occurs whenever the stock of emerging-market reserves is expected to limit the size of the bailout. The reserve constraint is binding when productivity shocks lie in the range −ε 0 ≤ ε ≤ ε . Note that the drop in expected reserves has a non-linear impact since the reduction in the supply of credit is magnified by the expected marginal bailout associated with an extra dollar of reserves. Hence, news about the expected reserve position of a country matters less for countries where the commitment to a "no-bailout" policy is credible or where the relative foreign indebtedness is small.
We also observe that an increase in reserve volatility shifts the supply of credit curve leftward by the amount:
An increase in volatility reduces the supply of credit in proportion to the expected probability of a bailout in the range where the scarcity of reserves binds partially, ε ≤ ε ≤ ε . This is the range where there is a full bailout if actual reserves turn out to be high but only a partial bailout if actual reserves turn out to be low. Recall that the threshold values defining this range, ε, ε , depend on both the expected reserve level and the degree of volatility. A fall in the expected reserve level expands the range as does an increase in volatility. (See (15) and (16)).
bailouts rises. The intuition for the latter result is based on a time inconsistency story .
A declared "no bailout" policy is not credible in regimes where the "too big to fail" argument or the lobbying of pressure groups forces the government to use international reserves for bailouts. In these circumstances, the lack of transparency of international reserves acts as a tax. The tax is larger in weak regimes where the probability of bailout is considered high.
Inspection of (18) reveals that the leftward shift in the supply of credit due to greater reserve uncertainty takes place only if reserve scarcity is a binding constraint.
Reserve scarcity binds as long as productivity shocks lie in the range −ε 0 ≤ ε ≤ ε , where we have assumed −ε 0 < ε . Given the definition of ε in (15), the assumption that
This condition implies that the supply of international credit is reduced by greater reserve volatility when the potential bailout in the worst state of nature (defined by the lowest productivity shock) is greater than the lowest possible reserve level. This condition is more likely to hold the lower is expected international reserves and the greater is the volatility of reserves. Such reserve uncertainty characterized the Korean episode and can help explain the collapse of the international credit market facing that emerging market.
IV. Conclusion
The unwillingness of foreign lenders to extend new credits or to roll over existing credits to emerging markets is thought to have been an important precipitating factor in the 1997-98 Asian crisis [Chang and Velasco (1998a, 1998b) , Radelet and Sachs (1998) ] This paper shows that when loan repayments become less certain, foreign lenders are less willing to offer international credit. More importantly, it demonstrates that reserve volatility can, under plausible circumstances, induce large adverse effects for emerging markets. Volatility that is benign when nonlinearities are absent generates large costs when nonlinear restrictions bind. We observe that when the expected reserve position of emerging markets is large relative to the potential bailout in a bad state of nature, reserve volatility is unimportant. The same amount of reserve volatility can cause a large reduction in the offered supply of international credit if the emerging market's foreign debt is large enough or if the collapse of output forces the private sector to downgrade its priors regarding repayment possibilities. In addition, reserve volatility that was formerly benign may lead to a reduced supply of international credit once investors become more pessimistic about the expected reserve position of emerging markets.
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13 The interaction between volatility and nonlinearity may help explain the finding that higher macroeconomic volatility in emerging markets is associated with lower private investment and economic growth. See Aizenman and Marion (1999) . 
